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There is now considerable evidence on the value of using external resources to 
promote the development of innovative technologies. Furthermore, the ability to 
experience innovations in business by external links that may help to avoid risk, 
improve the quality of natural products, which means qualifying business activities 
and promote companies capable of rationalizing and projecting high yields. This 
paper provides an approach from the transaction cost theory of Ronald Coase, in 
particular, provides preconditions to estimate the specific market of biotechnology. 
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Two decades ago (1991), Ronald Coase received the Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in Stockholm, Sweden. Since then, their 
assumptions and their approaches have expanded considerably since market 
issues, business, organizations, stock exchanges and trading systems to the 
comparative economic history (Coase, 1995). Outside the laws of mechanics 
bodies found in the markets are too contingent to meet mechanical lawlike 
principles (Coase, 1998A). The world market is too malleable (Coase, 1937a, 
1945, 1947a, 1960, 1961). The attribution of conventional interpretations of 
transaction costs is more ambiguous now than themselves known (Klaes, 
2000). What are the implications of transaction costs? (Dixit, 1996) What are 
the implications of transaction costs out of the markets? (Groenewegen, 1995) 
What about transaction costs in volatile markets? These and other questions 
suggest a broader context of the work of Coase. 
 
 
Remember that what interests the author is to develop an explanatory 
framework that helps us understand the difficulties of production in open 
markets (Coase, 1937b). Ie, to analyze how economic systems from what the 
author calls "the institutional structure of production" (Coase, 1991a). While 
some of the problems facing the economy is related to production, the focus is 
the mechanisms that create better or worse performance of the economy in 
societies with open markets (Coase, 1988D, 1990). 
 
 
Coase proposed an explanatory model field located between type Pigou 
productive theories / Robbins, and the scope for cost problems specific 
exemplary cases (Coase, 1945, 1946b). Following the evolution of the concept 
of transaction costs may also be ways to explain why markets do not have a 
perfect performance (Coase, 1960). Moreover, the nature of transaction costs 
reflects a domain that is beyond the scope of the term originally used by the 
author. After its original development, the systematization of the ideas of 
Ronald Coase found in Oliver Williamson, Harold Demsetz and Steven Cheung, 
among others. 
 
 
Beginning the decade of the fifties, the economy responds to problems of 
industrial organization and corporate matters. Coase exhibits his work in the 
broader context of economic history. The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith 
Coase serves to identify the subordinate role of central planning or government 
regulations in the smooth functioning of the economic system (Coase, 1974a), 
in effect, the economy may be coordinated by a price system (invisible hand) 
and with beneficial results. It is with respect to the wealth of nations, similar to 
what Whitehead said about philosophy after Plato, according to Coase's 
economic theory after Adam Smith, only footnotes wide his great work. 
Although the factors given after the nineties with technology developments, 
theories of consumer and securities markets (among others) add new 
conditions and problems in the markets. 
 
The hypothesis of economists after Adam Smith meets conditions to achieve 
results or, in another perspective, when the real world seems to have worked 
according to theory, so much the worse for the world (Coase, 1994). This is 
what seems to assume the historical reference that makes the reading of 
Ronald Coase on the economists of his time. So as with physics textbooks, the 
neoclassical version of the economy suggests that markets forcing changes 
leave the real world needs. The projection of the market in its most complete 
exposition resembles a system of extreme decentralization (Coase, 1988a). 
What does this mean? This is an image projected on the ability to self-
sustaining markets and relatively unnecessary role of governments (Coase, 
1988c). 
 
Excessive concentration in the price system has been connected with the 
reductionism of the neoclassical approach to the nature of markets (Coase, 
1945). In fact, the impression left by economists is that markets superstructure 
determines the types of behavior among agents. Above is the price system, 
below the world of people. That's a position that defends Lionel Robbins. In his 
Essay on the nature and significance of economic science, Robinson points out 
the obvious shortcomings of the old treatment of the theory of production with 
its approach to the property of the peasantry and industrial forms: "From the 
standpoint of the organization economist provision is a matter of industrial (or 
agricultural) if domestic international for a particular company, yes for "the" 
industry-... At the same time tends to leave the regulatory element completely 
out of the whole organization of production: the reciprocal relationship between 
prices and costs". 
 
 
The idea was that the economist Robbins should not be interested in what 
happens to the domestic laws of the organizations, but only what happens in 
the market, buying inputs and selling goods produced by these factors (Coase, 
1994 ). As Coase observed: "It totally ignores what happens between the 
factors of production and sale of such goods" (Coase 1960). To increase the 
flow of arguments in this direction neoclassical theory posits a micro that is 
largely a study of the pricing and production, "in fact, this part of the economy 
often is called theory of prices "(Coase, 1945). 
 
 
With this review, Coase prepared his arguments on the theory of transaction 
costs (Coase, 1960). The neglect of other aspects of the system has been 
enhanced by another feature of neoclassical theory: the increasing abstraction 
of the analysis does not seem interested in the detailed knowledge of the 
economic system in context. At least not for public policy issues or 
developments in technology or biotechnology appeal to you. After Coase others 
have corroborated some of the prejudices, Holmstrom and Tirole, for example, 
in "The Theory of the Firm" (Hanbook of Industrial Organization) conclude that 
"the proportion between evidence and theory is now ... very low in this field. " 
However, according to Coase, the authors still moves around within a 
theoretical level (Schmalensee, 1989). 
 
 
The theoretical device with which neoclassical economics has played a similar 
role to the principle of inertia in classical mechanics of Newton particles 
contributes to expand the speculation about the behavior of "markets" in the 
void left on their own motion or rest . The bodies 'natural' markets transactions 
include, however, serious flaws on a surface enough information problem 
(Coase, 1960, 1990, 1991a, 1998a). Coase's expression to relate the work of 
neoclassical economists is "blackboard economics" (Coase, 1991a). After two 
decades of theoretical advances proposed by Ronald Coase, allow simulation 
developments in the economy that are amazing, however, remains a matter of 
principle applied force. We have come to the blackboard to digital media, but 
the models built are still limited (Dhalman, 1979). 
 
 
In mainstream economic theory the market analogy recursive device relates as 
a "black box". One way surprising, according to Coase, because a majority of 
resources are used in modern economic systems are used within the company, 
and the decision of how to use these resources depends more on 
administrative decisions directly from the operation of the market (Coase, 
1994). The resulting paradox is a dual purpose, according to Coase (1988a). 
The economic system depends largely on how these organizations bring their 
issues, specifically, the modern corporation (Coase, 1972). Moreover, it is 
surprising that the economists who show interest in the price system, manifest 
disregard for the context of markets. Specifically, for the institutional 
arrangements that determine relative exchange processes (Coase, 1991). The 
conventional theory then, in the opinion of Ronald Coase, is "a very incomplete 
theory" (1981a). 
 
 
In The Nature of Firm (1937), Coase responds more directly to the errors of 
conventional wisdom. Remember that some standard wisdom quoted Arthur 
Salter expression: "The normal economic system works itself." Then explained 
that a competitive economic system coordinated by prices would lead to the 
production of goods and services valued by consumers. Approaches of this 
nature were intended to streamline the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith (Coase, 
1977). 
 
This early work of Coase is key to understanding the elegant insight of the 
theorem. The existence of transaction costs explains the nature of the 
company, although its scope is irrelevant for the rest of the economy (Coase, 
1937a, 1945, 1960, 1965, 1972). The investments or risks of founding a 
company depends on transaction costs, so much information, the seriousness 
of the contracts, compliance and prevailing legal order can also affect the goods 
and services produced (Coase, 1988a) . The chain of processes that generates 
a spontaneous market order depends on transaction costs. In other words, 
without the transaction costs would remain unexplained many important 
phenomena in the economy. Coase raises its argument to see that in essential 
terms of transaction costs can affirmatively act as barriers to monopoly and, 
negatively, to protect the interests of the market in cases where governments 
seek to impose unlimited. In summary, the strong assumption of the Coase 
theorem rests on the advantages for society to reduce transaction costs, while 
the other to impose barriers to prevent the violation of economic rights of the 
market (Coase, 1988B). 
 
 
Market with (and without) transaction costs 
 
As shown, the Coase theorem is related to the analysis of transactions that 
operate under different circumstances and determined by the existence (or 
absence) of transaction costs. Some misinterpretations of his theorem 
describes "a world of zero" as the world Coaseano ... what can not be further 
from reality as this was the world that the author wanted to leave that 
economists "(Butler, 2003, p. 136), are derived from studies of the same, limited 
to a single level. The results of the analysis conducted Coase, in the case of the 
farmer and the farmer, leading to important implications. Coase concludes that 
in the absence of transaction costs, the parties are able to solve problems and 
find the production level that maximizes the social benefit for themselves 
(Coase, 1935, 1965, 1988a). This result can be used interchangeably with pre-
allocation of property rights (Coase, 1994). This suggests then that the law and 
court decisions have no effect on the result (Coase, 1994). From that 
perspective, it follows at once that the correction of market inefficiencies is 
possible when there is effective coordination between market actors. 
 
 
However, the fundamental assumption that this is possible is the absence of 
additional costs involved in carrying out the transaction. Further analysis of the 
case puts into consideration the costs of activities in reality and face: 1 - the 
search for an agent who wants to negotiate, 2 - the process of informing you 
want to negotiate with him, 3 - to determine and report the terms to be 
negotiated, 4 - to conduct the negotiation of such terms, 5 - to pursue the 
development of the contract containing these conditions, 6 - to carry out 
inspections to ensure compliance with commitments leads to a different 
outcome Coase . Coase determines that the value of the costs for such actions 
can be so high that it is feasible that prevents profitable transactions and 
therefore, are carried out (Coase, 1994, p.134). The transaction in this regard 
will be made only if the benefits outweigh the costs of achieving this (Coase, 
1994, p.135). 
 
 
 
In relation to costs incurred during the completion of a transaction, further 
developments carried out by Becker Williamson and transaction costs 
associated with different aspects that contribute to the development of the 
theory (Williamson, Winter, 1991). This is linked with problems related to the 
internal organization of firms, the costs of collection, processing and 
communicating information, trade flows in decision-making, the goals and 
organizational behavior, the nature of relationships contract, the impact of 
information, opportunism, moral hazard and avoidance: the process of 
negotiation, bounded rationality, information asymmetries, uncertainty, adverse 
selection, costs of drafting, for payment enforceability contracts, sequential 
bargaining processes on the distribution of the benefits associated with fixed 
investment, and the internal structure of the organization, among others. In a 
specialized field such as biotechnology, this research explores the obstacles 
and limits to access information from quality imported equipment, contractual, 
legal system and administrative inefficiency in government agencies. 
 
 
The above factors and Coase's analysis indicate the feasibility of individuals 
lack the ability to negotiate for transactions that maximize the social value of 
production. Similarly, it is known that the greater number of parties involved in 
the transaction, the lower the possibility of reaching a voluntary agreement 
(McEachern, 2000). Situations for which the government can play a role 
through legislation to reduce coordination costs, assign responsibilities, reduce 
uncertainty and transaction risk. In addition to systematizing the process that 
will streamline contractual arrangements with interests in investment companies 
and universities. Thus, the legal system becomes relevant to the scope of the 
optimal production level that maximizes social product with a higher level of 
efficiency (Coase, 1994), in order to avoid obstacles to transactions that lead to 
optimal results. 
 
The effect generated by the law in this regard stems from its ability to affect 
private marginal costs (Betlan, 2003). He believes that "if trading is costly and 
imperfect information exists, then the rules help to reach the spot" (p.140). 
However, the benefit from the legal system must be considered within a 
framework of relativity in as "property rights may affect the economic efficiency 
for better or worse" (p.139). In that sense, "an incorrect allocation of property 
rights can lead to greater social marginal cost, and lower social solution" 
(p.140). Reason suggests caution in the implementation of measures arising 
from government action to correct market failures (Betlan, 2003, p.141). In this 
respect, Coase suggested not to make generalizations about the benevolence 
of government intervention and promotes a study of the peculiarities of each 
case to determine the mechanism of convenience in order to promote greater 
efficiency in the value of production (Coase, 1994). 
 
 
 
Transaction costs, externalities and innovation 
 
 
There is now considerable evidence on the value of using external resources to 
promote the development of innovative technologies. Furthermore, the ability to 
experience innovations in business by external links that may help to avoid risk, 
improve the quality of natural products, which means qualifying business 
activities (Powell, 1998), indeed, promote businesses with the ability to 
streamline and projecting high yields (Gemser and Wijnberg, 1995). 
 
For the company, however, the potential for developing new products involves 
important strategic challenges. In many cases it requires developments in 
marketing, sales or production joint ventures (complementarity of competence, 
honesty, quality of the partners, etc.), yet the problems are more complex when 
it comes to developing new technology products, due to the uncertainty of the 
contracts, administrative procedures for imports, property rights and the 
fulfillment of the agreement between the parties. Some researchers maintain 
that openness to external resources, talent out of the same organization, 
innovation and sensitivity to external partners, contributes to significant savings 
in costs by offering new products. Also it can help minimize the risks (Quinn, 
2000), Rubenstein, 1994). Others argue that the benefits from outsourcing 
generation technology products have been exaggerated also strategically can 
be a barrier to long term to run the talent and capabilities of the company 
(Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). 
 
 
The relevance of this debate is that the projects to develop innovative products 
(biotech, for example), with transaction costs, in a broad sense, can mean 
significant ingredients of the total set of costs that may be companies or firms 
with results more predictable. Paradoxically, it is possible to estimate that 
transaction costs, at least in the perspective discovered by Coase and 
Williamson, significant fissures have yet to assess these issues in detail 
(Groenewegen, 1995). This is due to appear in the original formulation of the 
Coase theorem and further development of theory in Williamson (1991), there 
were a business model static type that does not reflect (actually) the dynamics 
of change, learning errors discovered by empirical experience. 
 
This weakness, however, undermines the epistemological value that has the 
original theory on transaction costs. While new product development in 
biotechnology is dynamic and uncertain, it is also important to recognize that 
the process involves a lot of steps that are carried out separately, at least some 
processes can be considered as part of habits and daily trials. When the results 
are relatively safe is predictable transaction costs, i. e., the development of 
models, replicas of essays, and so on. This suggests that innovation see 
demand different processes, each one related to a particular aspect of 
technology, which has in many cases risks, rewards and balances when they 
are outsourced. In other words, the transaction costs are critical because the 
degree of outsourcing change depending on the evolution of the innovation 
process. 
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